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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Institute of Medicine, each year between 
44,000 and 98,000 people die in hospitals as a result of medical 
error.1  The ensuing costs of medical errors include patients’ lost 
 
       †  J.D. Candidate 2006, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Psychology, 
Augsburg College, 2000; Medical Specialist, Army National Guard, 1998-2001; 
Corporal, United States Marine Corps, 1993-1997.  Special thanks extended to 
Shannon Gregory, Kathryn Gammelgaard, and Ginger Gammelgaard for their 
continual encouragement and support. 
 1. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, HEALTH CARE COSTS, 
AHRQ PUBLICATION NO. 02-P033 (2002), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/news/ 
costsfact.htm.  “Even at the lowest number, medical errors would be the eighth 
leading cause of death in this country, bypassing motor vehicle accidents, breast 
cancer, and AIDS. About 7,000 people die from medication errors alone, which is 
about 16% more deaths than can be attributed to work-related injuries.”  Id. 
1
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income, disability, and health care, all of which may add up to $29 
billion annually.2  As a result, some patients must live with serious 
injuries for the rest of their lives.  For example, a health care 
provider’s failure to adequately monitor a mother’s pregnancy 
resulted in her son being born with permanent brain damage.3  
That child suffers from cerebral palsy and significant physical, 
cognitive, and behavioral difficulties that will endure for the rest of 
his life.4 
Patients that are injured by physician negligence look to the 
legal system to recover damages for the harms committed by those 
physicians.5  State tort law provides the legal foundation for 
recovery in such medical malpractice lawsuits.6  The four types of 
recoverable damages available in most medical malpractice lawsuits 
are economic,7 noneconomic,8 punitive,9 and total damages.10  As 
compared to economic damages, noneconomic damages are 
 
 2. QUALITY INTERAGENCY COORDINATION TASK FORCE, DOING WHAT COUNTS 
FOR PATIENT SAFETY: FEDERAL ACTIONS TO REDUCE MEDICAL ERRORS AND THEIR 
IMPACT (2000), at http://www.quic.gov/report/index.htm. 
 3. Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 
55-56 (Neb. 2003). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Jason Leo, Case Note, Torts—Medical Malpractice: The Legislature’s Attempt to 
Prevent Cases Without Merit Denies Valid Claims: Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 27 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2000). 
 6. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF 
RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, GAO-03-0836, 2 n.1 (2003) 
[hereinafter IMPLICATIONS].  “Medical malpractice lawsuits are generally based on 
principles of tort law. A tort is a wrongful act or omission by an individual that 
causes harm to another individual. Typically, a legal claim of malpractice would be 
based on a claim that the negligence of a provider caused injury and the injured 
party would seek damages.”  Id. 
 7. Economic damages are defined as “those designed to compensate the 
plaintiff for his or her out-of-pocket expenses. These include any tangible 
economic loss, such as past and future medical expenses, costs of follow-up 
treatment, and lost wages.”  Christopher S. Kozak, A Review of Federal Malpractice 
Tort Reform Alternatives, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 599, 621 n.98 (1995). 
 8. Noneconomic damages are defined as “the portion of the award that 
compensates for ‘pain and suffering.’”  Id. n.99.  “Because there exists no basis by 
which to measure the mental and physical anguish of an injury in its 
rehabilitation, these damages tend to be the most unpredictable.”  Id. 
 9. Punitive damages are defined as a tool to “punish tortfeasers for their 
outrageous conduct and to deter similar future conduct.”  Id. n.100.  Punitive 
damages are “rarely used in malpractice cases unless the physician is found to have 
acted with willful indifference to or in deliberate disregard of the patient’s needs.”  
Id.  
 10. Id. at 621.   
2
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difficult to quantify and may create unpredictable damage awards.11  
Medical malpractice insurers, physicians, and medical associations 
have therefore blamed unlimited noneconomic damages for the 
rising costs of medical malpractice liability insurance.12  However, 
capping noneconomic damages limits the compensation available 
for a patient’s very real injuries,13 undermining the opportunity for 
an aggrieved person to be made whole.14 
The threat of a medical malpractice insurance “crisis” 
continues to influence legislators, health care providers, and 
insurers to encourage tort reform.15  In 2003 alone, forty-one states 
introduced legislation that either proposed or changed caps on 
noneconomic damages for medical malpractice awards.16  The 
primary focus of most legislative tort reform efforts generally 
 
 11. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: MULTIPLE FACTORS 
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, GAO-03-702, 42 (2003) 
[hereinafter MULTIPLE FACTORS].  Even though noneconomic damages are 
difficult to quantify, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that “it does not 
follow that the difficulty in quantifying compensatory damages for noneconomic 
injuries is alleviated by imposing an arbitrary limitation or cap in all cases.”  Best v. 
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1076 (Ill. 1997). 
 12. See MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 8.  “In response to concerns over 
rising premium rates, physicians, medical associations, and insurers have pushed 
for state and federal legislation that would, among other things, limit the amount 
of damages paid out on medical malpractice claims.”  Id. 
 13. ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, FACT SHEET: OPPOSE S. 11: THE 
SAME OLD STORY, available at http://www.atla.org/consumer 
mediaresources/tier3/ press_room/facts/medmal/s11.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 
2004).  Real injuries that are entitled to compensation include: “loss of a limb or 
sight, the loss of mobility, the loss of fertility, excruciating pain and permanent 
and severe disfigurement. . . . [and] the loss of a child or a spouse.”  Id. 
 14. If $250,000 noneconomic damage caps were imposed, then “victims 
[would] receive arbitrary compensation for the horrendous and oftentimes 
permanent injuries they suffer, rather than allowing a jury to determine the 
appropriate level of compensation in each individual case.”  Help Efficient, 
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th 
Cong., Comments (2003). 
 15. See Kozak, supra note 7, at 600; see also Mitchell S. Berger, Following the 
Doctor’s Orders—Caps on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases, 22 
RUTGERS L.J. 173, 174 (1991).  “To reduce malpractice claims payments and 
insurance premiums and for other reasons, some have advocated changes to tort 
laws, such as placing caps on the amount of damages or limits on the amount of 
attorney fees that may be paid under a malpractice lawsuit. These changes are 
collectively referred to as ‘tort reforms.’”   IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 2 n.1.   
 16. HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, HIAA REPORTS ON STATE 
HEALTH INSURANCE LEGISLATION (2003), available at http://www.hiaa.org/news/ 
newsitem.cfm?ContentID=24412 (on file with author).  In late 2003, HIAA merged 
with AAHP to form America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP). Further 
information can be found at http://www.ahip.org. 
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centers upon capping patient damages.17  Capping noneconomic 
damages, however, has always been highly controversial.18  In 2004, 
physicians and health insurers successfully made medical liability 
reform a presidential campaign issue.19  The vice-presidential 
candidates first debated the issue and the presidential candidates, 
President George W. Bush and Senator John F. Kerry, followed 
suit.20  In fact, one survey indicated that eighty-seven percent of 
Americans viewed the presidential candidates’ health care 
proposals to be influential in determining who to vote for.21   
This note explores the history behind the rising costs of 
medical malpractice insurance rates and the responsive state 
legislative proposals to limit noneconomic damages.22  The current 
state of health care liability and the recent federal proposals that 
include caps on noneconomic damages are then discussed.23  This 
note analyzes the reasons why the federal government should not 
cap noneconomic damages, primarily because: (1) states are better 
able to regulate health care, (2) noneconomic damages are not the 
determinate cause of rising medical malpractice insurance rates, 
and (3) caps infringe on equal protection guarantees by limiting 
compensation of medical malpractice victims.24  This note 
highlights the current state of health care liability in Minnesota and 
how the Minnesota legislature has dealt with rising medical 
 
 17. Kozak, supra note 7, at 619. 
 18. Berger, supra note 15, at 183. 
 19. Professional Liability: GOP Senators Fall Short of Votes Needed to Start 
Consideration of Malpractice Bill, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (July 10, 
2003). 
 20. Joel B. Finkelstein, Health Care Emerges as a Major Issue in 2004 Election, 
AMEDNEWS.COM (April 12, 2004), at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/ 
2004/04/12/gvsd0412.htm.  Transcripts of all presidential and vice-presidential 
debates are available on The Washington Post website, available at 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/elections/2004/debates/ (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2004).  The vice-presidential candidates were first to raise the issue of 
medical liability tort reform: Vice-president Dick Cheney stated, “[W]hat we need 
to do is cap non-economic damages.”  John Edwards responded, “We want to put 
more responsibility on the lawyers to require . . . independent experts to 
determine if the case is serious and meritorious before it can be filed.”  Transcript: 
Vice Presidential Debate, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio at 42-
43 (Oct. 5, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_1005.html. 
 21. Finkelstein, supra note 20. 
 22. See infra Parts II, III. 
 23. See infra Part III.A-B. 
 24. See infra Part III.B. 
4
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malpractice insurance costs.25  Finally, this note concludes that 
noneconomic damage caps are not the panacea to the “medical 
liability crisis.”  States should therefore continue to regulate the 
health care industry through other reform measures.26 
II. HISTORY 
The existence of a medical liability crisis and its possible 
underlying causes are controversial topics.  The General 
Accounting Office (GAO), an investigative arm of Congress, once 
acknowledged that “[h]ealth care providers have suffered through 
three medical malpractice insurance ‘crises’ in the past thirty 
years.”27  During the 1970s, the first crisis occurred as medical 
malpractice suits reached their peak.28  Medical malpractice liability 
insurance rates climbed and resulted in some physicians being 
unable to obtain adequate coverage.29  After a brief period of 
stability, medical malpractice premium rates rapidly increased 
again in the 1980s and later in the 1990s.30  The possible causes of 
the medical malpractice insurance increases are always subject to 
debate.31 
One plausible explanation is that the fear of possible medical 
malpractice liability causes physicians to practice “defensive 
medicine,” which occurs when physicians perform costly additional 
tests or unnecessary procedures to avoid possible litigation.32  
“Defensive medicine” may exist, but it is difficult to measure its 
effect on health care costs.33  Whatever the cause, rising medical 
malpractice insurance rates often result in physicians not 
performing high-risk procedures, moving to states with lower 
 
 25. See infra Part III.C. 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
 27. See MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 46. 
 28. Leo, supra note 5, at 1402.  “[T]here were approximately ‘five medical 
malpractice suits filed for every 10 doctors.’”  Id. at 1402-03 (citations omitted). 
 29. Berger, supra note 15, at 175; Leo, supra note 5, at 1403. 
 30. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 1. 
 31. Berger, supra note 15, at 177.  Physicians and insurers attributed rising 
costs to both the quantity of suits filed and the size of damage awards, while 
lawyers and consumer groups blamed excessive insurance profits and the medical 
profession’s inability to eliminate substandard practitioners.  Id.  The decline in 
the U.S. stock market in the early 1970s also contributed to the rising costs.  Id. at 
177-78. 
 32. Leo, supra note 5, at 1403. 
 33. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 27. 
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insurance rates, or retiring.34  This effect has spurred debatable 
concern as to the accessibility of health care, especially in rural 
areas.35 
In response, nearly every state has passed tort reform 
legislation.36  Reform has included varying measures: from statutes 
that shorten the statute of limitations to statutes that limit the 
damages a plaintiff can recover in medical malpractice suits.37  
California was one of the first states to enact legislation that 
specifically limited noneconomic damages.38  California’s Medical 
Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA)39 limited 
noneconomic damages to $250,000 and is still in place today, 
despite having never been adjusted for inflation.40 
Twenty-six states followed California’s initiative and enacted 
caps on noneconomic damages between the years 1975 and 1995.41  
 
 34. Id. at 1; Leo, supra note 5, at 1403; MINNESOTA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 
ISSUE BRIEF—MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, at http://www.mnmed.org/advocacy 
News/tpmedical malpractice.cfm (last updated Jan. 17, 2003) [hereinafter 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE]. 
 35. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 38 (explaining that the American Medical 
Association questioned GAO’s finding that access problems were not widespread 
based on GAO’s work in five states, which were among the most often-cited 
examples of “crisis states”). 
 36. Berger, supra note 15, at 179 (explaining the results of the crisis in the 
1970s and the states’ response of tort reform to preserve health care access at a 
reasonable cost); Leo, supra note 5, at 1403-04. 
 37. Leo, supra note 5, at 1404. 
 38. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY, IMPACT ON STATE LAWS LIMITING 
MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS, TABLE 1A: 
SUPPLY OF PHYSICIANS IN STATES WITH CAPS ON MALPRACTICE AWARDS (2002) 
[hereinafter TABLE 1A], at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/tortcaps/torttab1a.htm 
(showing that California, Indiana, and Louisiana imposed noneconomic damage 
caps in medical malpractice suits during 1975). 
 39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (1975).  The California Supreme Court 
determined that the California legislature was responding to the rising cost of 
medical malpractice insurance that posed serious problems for California’s health 
care system, which “threaten[ed] to curtail the availability of medical care in some 
parts of the state and creat[ed] the very real possibility that many doctors would 
practice without insurance, leaving patients who might be injured by such doctors 
with the prospect of uncollectible judgments.”  Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 
695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal. 1985). 
 40. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act 
of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong., Comments (2003) (noting that California’s cap was 
enacted in 1975 and has never been adjusted for inflation, which, if adjusted for 
inflation, would be $1,500,000 in 2003). 
 41. TABLE 1A, supra note 38; AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY, IMPACT ON 
STATE LAWS LIMITING MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF 
PHYSICIANS, TABLE 1B: SUPPLY OF PHYSICIANS IN STATE WITHOUT CAPS ON 
MALPRACTICE AWARDS FOR NONECONOMIC DAMAGES (2002) [hereinafter TABLE 1B], 
6
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However, courts in seven of those states overturned the capping 
legislation.42  A principle reason for overturning the legislation was 
that limiting recovery in medical malpractice lawsuits by itself is an 
arbitrary classification that violates plaintiffs’ constitutional 
guarantee to equal protection.43  After courts overturned the 
legislation, some state legislatures persisted in again passing 
capping legislation for a second time, but the courts once again 
rejected their attempts.44  Consequently, by the end of 2000 only 
twenty states had noneconomic damages caps in place.45 
In 2002, Mississippi, Nevada, and Ohio continued the 
legislative push and passed legislation that imposed noneconomic 
damage caps.46  In 2003, several additional state legislatures either 
introduced or changed limits on noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice suits: forty-one states introduced bills, eleven of which 
passed the bills proposed.47  For example, in June of 2003, Texas 
 
at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/tortcaps/torttab1b.htm (listing Alabama, 
Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin as states enacting caps between 1975 and 1995). 
 42. TABLE 1B, supra note 41 (listing Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, 
Texas, and Washington as overturning caps on noneconomic damages).  Florida, 
Ohio, and Texas have since passed legislation capping noneconomic damages.   
Id. 
 43. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned a $500,000 
noneconomic damage cap on constitutional grounds in 1976 and did so again in 
1997.  Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass’n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976); Best v. 
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).  In Wright, the plaintiff 
successfully argued that noneconomic caps “arbitrarily classified, and 
unreasonably discriminated against, the most seriously injured victims of medical 
malpractice, but has not limited the recovery of those victims who suffer moderate 
or minor injuries.”  Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 741. 
 44. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM (2003), at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/7861.html [hereinafter MEDICAL 
LIABILITY REFORM]. 
 45. TABLE 1A, supra note 38 (listing Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, 
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
 46. TABLE 1B, supra note 41. 
 47. HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, STATE ISSUES TRACKING 
REPORT: MIDYEAR REVIEW at 4 (2003), at http://member ship.hiaa.org/pdfs/ 
communications/030729statetrack.pdf.  Medical malpractice and tort reform have 
emerged as high profile issues in 2003.  Id.  The most significant health insurance 
issues facing state legislatures during the first six months of 2003 were “mandated 
benefits, medical malpractice reform, privacy, and prescription drug coverage.”  
Id. 
7
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Governor Rick Perry (R) signed legislation that imposes a $250,000 
cap on noneconomic damages for health care providers and health 
care institutions.48  On September 13, 2003, Texas voters 
subsequently approved an amendment to the Texas Constitution 
that authorizes the legislature to set limits on noneconomic 
damage awards.49  Similarly, in August of 2003, after months of 
debate, Florida Governor Jeb Bush (R) signed a bill that provides 
tiered capping of noneconomic damages at $500,000 for physicians 
and $750,000 for hospitals.50  In May of 2004, eight additional state 
legislatures continued the pursuit of tort reform measures.51  As of 
publication, a grand total of twenty-five states have effectively 
passed noneconomic damage caps of varying amounts applicable to 
medical malpractice suits.52 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF HEALTH CARE LIABILITY 
The American Medical Association (AMA) continually 
evaluates the state of health care liability in the United States by 
analyzing several independent sources of information.53  The AMA 
 
 48. Texas: Governor Signs a Bill, Calls it “Most Sweeping in the Nation,” in BNA’S 
HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (June 20, 2003). 
 49. Texas: Voters Approve Constitution Change that Clears Way for Damages Caps 
Law, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (Sept. 16, 2003).  Kathy Walt, 
spokesman for Governor Rick Perry, said that the “approval of Proposition 12 also 
has national significance. . . .  The governor expects President Bush and Congress 
will view Texas as the model for passing meaningful medical liability and general 
tort reform at the federal level.”  Id. 
 50. Drew Douglas, Florida: Gov. Bush Signs Malpractice Reform Bill: Trial Bar 
Vows Constitutional Challenge, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (Aug. 15, 2003).  
Prior to passing the bill the House pushed for a $250,000 cap while the Senate 
opposed caps, but later modified its stance to include cap proposals within the bill 
that ranged from $500,000-$750,000.  Id.  “The cap was probably the most 
contentious part of the negotiations while formulating this legislative package.”  
Id. 
 51. TANYA ALBERT, 3 STATES PASS TORT REFORM; OTHERS STILL WAITING (June 
14, 2004), at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/06/14/gvsa0614.htm.  
New Jersey, Ohio, and Oklahoma passed tort reform measures, while Alaska, 
Connecticut, Iowa, Missouri, and New Hampshire rejected tort reform.  Id. 
 52. TABLE 1A, supra note 38; TABLE 1B, supra note 41; Adam D. Glassman, The 
Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability Actions: Will They Cure the 
Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 432-58 (2004) (listing the 
individual state laws pertaining to medical liability). 
 53. Memorandum from Daniel Blaney-Koen, Field Communications Officer, 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (June 2002) (on file with author) (listing 
numerous sources analyzed, such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Agency for HealthCare Research and Quality, General Accounting 
Office, and the Joint Economic Commission of the U.S. Congress).   
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considers two primary factors in determining the scope and depth 
of “America’s Liability Crisis:” (1) the magnitude of decreasing 
access to health care and (2) physicians ceasing certain high-risk 
procedures such as delivering babies and emergency care.54  As of 
January 2005, the AMA indicated that twenty states were actually in 
“medical liability crisis,” while twenty-four states showed “problem 
signs.”55  The AMA categorized California, along with Colorado, 
New Mexico, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Louisiana, as the only “OK” 
states in the area of medical liability.56 
At the federal level, during the 2003 legislative session, federal 
legislative proposals attempted to parallel California’s cap of 
$250,000 and preempt state laws governing health care lawsuits.57  
However, these proposals ignored the fact that following the 
California legislature’s enactment of noneconomic damage caps, 
California’s malpractice insurance premiums continued to increase 
through 1988 to an “all-time high” that was 450% higher than in 
1975, the year that MICRA was enacted.58  California ultimately 
passed insurance reform in 1988, which contributed to the 
stabilization of medical malpractice insurance rates.59  Thus, the 
 
 54. Id. (considering the additional factors of “[a] state’s legislative, legal, and 
judicial climate; [a]ffordability and availability of professional liability insurance; 
and [t]rend[s] of jury awards and settlements”). 
 55. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMERICA’S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS: A 
NATIONAL VIEW, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11871.html 
(last updated Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS] (showing 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming as states 
in full-blown “medical liability crisis” and showing Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia as states 
showing “problem signs”).  The AMA does not explicitly define “problem signs,” 
but the inferred meaning would be those states on the verge of being in “medical 
liability crisis.”  See id.   
 56. MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS, supra note 55. 
 57. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 
2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong., Comments (2003). 
 58. Glassman, supra note 52, at 459 (quoting THE FOUNDATION OF TAXPAYER 
AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, HOW INSURANCE REFORM LOWERED DOCTORS’ MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE RATES IN CALIFORNIA: AND HOW MALPRACTICE CAPS FAIL, (March 7, 
2003), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.com). 
 59. Id.; see also ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, THE TRUTH ABOUT 
CAPS- THEY DON’T WORK, at http://www.atla.org/ConsumerMediaResources/ 
Tier3/press_room/FACTS/medmal/capsfactsheet.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).  
The California Proposition 103 required prior approval of insurance rates and also 
9
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reasonable conclusion is that insurance reform, not noneconomic 
damage caps, is what caused the medical malpractice insurance 
rates to decline, making California an “OK” state in the area of 
medical liability.60  The federal proposals based on California’s 
legislation similarly ignored the fact that Massachusetts, Missouri, 
and West Virginia are all in “medical liability crisis” despite having 
noneconomic damage caps in place since 1986.61 
A. Federal Proposals to Limit Noneconomic Damages in the Twenty-First 
Century 
Passing federal legislation to cap noneconomic damages has 
proven to be a continual battle.  In 2000, the revised Health Care 
Liability Reform Act of 1997 was first introduced in the House of 
Representatives.62  The proposed legislation was intended to 
impose certain requirements on health care liability claims, 
including a $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages.63  The bill 
was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary but was not 
reintroduced back to the House.64  The following year, the House 
of Representatives tried again and introduced the Medical 
Malpractice Rx Act.65  This bill also proposed a $250,000 limit on 
noneconomic damages.66  The Medical Malpractice Rx Act was 
referred to the subcommittee on Health and Environment but was 
once again not reintroduced back to the House.67 
The Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care 
Act of 200268 (HEALTH Act of 2002) was introduced in the House 
of Representatives on April 25, 2002.69  The HEALTH Act of 2002 
stated goals of improving accessibility to health care and the quality 
of medical care by reducing the burden of medical liability.70  This 
 
required the Commissioner of Insurance to request a public hearing if a 
commercial carrier requests a rate increase of greater than 15%.  MULTIPLE 
FACTORS, supra note 11, at 59. 
 60. See Glassman, supra note 52, at 459. 
 61. TABLE 1B, supra note 41. 
 62. H.R. 1091, 105th Cong. (2000). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. H.R. 2242, 106th Cong. (2001). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 69. Melissa A. Wojtylak et al., Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 38 TORT 
TRIAL & INS. PRACT. L.J. 549, 551 (2003). 
 70. Id.  The purposes of the proposed legislation are listed as improving 
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proposed legislation similarly limited noneconomic damages at 
$250,000, regardless of the number of defendants a plaintiff sues.71  
The HEALTH Act of 2002 was designed to preempt state laws 
concerning medical liability claims unless the applicable state law 
provided greater protection for health care providers.72  The House 
of Representatives passed the HEALTH Act of 2002, but after two 
readings in the Senate73 the Act was referred to the Judiciary 
Committee and never voted on.74 
On March 21, 2003, The HEALTH Act of 2003 was read for 
the first time in the House of Representatives.75  The HEALTH Act 
of 2003 stated the same goals of improving access to health care as 
well as improving medical care by reducing the burden the liability 
system weighs on the health care system.76  Once again, the 
proposed cap on noneconomic damages was set at $250,000.77  The 
Health Act of 2003 eventually passed in the House, but again was 
only read twice in the Senate and never voted on.78 
On June 28, 2003, the Senate Republicans introduced the 
Patients First Act of 2003.79  The Patients First Act of 2003 was 
intended to increase access to quality health care by reducing 
liability cost effects.80  The bill was very similar to the HEALTH Act 
of 2003 in that both would have imposed a $250,000 cap on 
noneconomic damages in health care lawsuits.81  The Patients First 
Act, however, hit a political impasse when on July 7, Senate 
Republicans attempted to bring the legislation to the floor but the 
Democrats objected to the motion to proceed the bill.82 
 
availability of health care where health care liability claims have contributed to 
decreasing availability of services, reducing health care liability insurance costs, 
ensuring adequate compensation for patients with meritorious injury claims, and 
improving fairness and cost efficiency of the alternative dispute resolution system 
by reducing uncertainty of damage awards.  Id. 
 71. Id. at 552. 
 72. Id. 
 73. S. 2793, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 74. H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 2793, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 75. H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. S. 607, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 79. S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Elizabeth White, Professional Liability: No Senate Action on Malpractice, as 
Republicans, Democrats Trade Blame, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (July 9, 2003). 
 82. Elizabeth White, Professional Liability: Senate Democrats Object to GOP 
Bringing Damage Caps Bill to the Floor, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (July 8, 
2003) [hereinafter White].  Senators voted along party lines except two 
11
Gregory: Note: Capping Noneconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice Suits Is
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
9GREGORY.DOC 3/13/2005  4:16:24 PM 
1042 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
Federal legislative activity on the issue continued when the 
House Republicans introduced the HEALTH Act of 2004 on May 5, 
2004.83  As before, limits on noneconomic damages were set at 
$250,000.84  On May 12, the House successfully passed the bill by a 
vote of 229-197.85  The bill was never voted on in the Senate, 
however, the HEALTH Act of 2005 has rekindled the proposed 
$250,000 noneconomic damage cap in any health care lawsuit.86  
The critical fate of capping noneconomic damages is in the hands 
of the 109th Congress.  
Some Republicans and Democrats are able to agree that rising 
malpractice premiums are causing health care accessibility 
problems; however, they are unable to agree on a solution.87  
Generally, Republican lawmakers continue to focus on capping 
damages and other limitations on medical lawsuits, while 
Democrats focus on tightening rules for medical malpractice 
insurance carriers.88  Medical liability reform legislation therefore 
continues to be shut down in the Senate, but the controversy of 
capping noneconomic damages continues. 
 
B. The Federal Government Should Not Impose Caps on Noneconomic 
Damages 
 
1. States Regulate Health Care 
 
Legislators continually take sides about whether the federal 
government should take over traditionally state regulated health 
care reform.  On one side of the debate, Senate Republican 
Conference Chairman Rick Santorum (R.-Pa.) stated that health 
care reform is a federal matter because rising medical malpractice 
 
Republicans who voted with the Democrats: Lindsey O. Graham (S.C.) and 
Richard A. Selby (Ala.).  Id.  Three Democratic Senators were missing for the vote.  
Id. 
 83. H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  On May 13, the bill was laid on the table and its text was appended to 
H.R. 4279.  Id. 
 86. H.R. 4279, 108th Cong. (2004). This bill was received in the Senate on 
May 17, 2004, read twice, placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar, and never 
voted on.  Id.  New capping legislation was introduced on February 2, 2005 and 
has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce.  H.R. 534, 109th Cong. (2005).  Related bills have also 
been introduced in the Senate.  S. 366, 367, & 354, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 87. White, supra note 82. 
 88. Id. 
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insurance premiums take a financial toll on the federal health care 
programs of Medicare and Medicaid.89  The Patients First Act 
likewise stated that the health care and insurance industries are 
affecting interstate commerce and federal spending.90  On the 
other side of the debate, some members of Congress disagree that 
health care reform is a federal issue because tort reform proposals 
are historically state legislative decisions that are not governed by 
the federal legislature.91  The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed that 
Congress cannot “cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”92 
The American Bar Association’s Committee on Medical 
Professional Liability also contends that medical professional 
liability issues, including damage caps in medical malpractice cases, 
should remain “tort-based and state-based.”93  Indeed, the states 
have had authority over medical liability laws for over 200 years.94  
This is because each individual state considers unique factors in 
addressing issues of health care lawsuits.95  Thus, the individual 
state is in the best position to determine which tort reform 
measures most clearly address the health care matters within the 
state. 
The judiciary and legislative branches of the federal 
government have upheld state regulatory powers in the area of 
health care.  The U.S.  Supreme Court has recognized states as the 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003).  The Patients First Act of 2003 stated that the 
health care and insurance industries affect interstate commerce by “contributing 
to the high costs of health care and premiums for health care liability insurance 
purchased by health care system providers.”  Id. § 2(a)(2).  Congress also found 
that health care liability systems throughout the states have a “significant effect on 
the amount, distribution, and use of Federal funds because of the large number of 
individuals who receive health care benefits under programs operated or financed 
by the Federal government.”  Id. § 2(a)(3). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 108-32, pt. 2 at 39 (2003). 
 92. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 93. Douglas, supra note 50.   
 94. Letter from Robert D. Evans, American Bar Association, to the United 
States House of Representatives, 108th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2003), at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/108th/mpl031003.html [hereinafter 
Evans].  The letter explained that the system of allowing states to regulate the 
resolution of cases within their borders is the “hallmark of our American Justice 
System.”  Id.  This is “[b]ecause of the role they have played, the states are the 
repositories of experience and expertise in these matters.”  Id. 
 95. Joyce E. Butler, Medicare: State Lawmakers’ Group Urges Congress to Adopt 
Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (July 29, 2003) 
(referring to the Law and Criminal Justice Committee’s resolution opposing the 
federal government’s preemption of existing state law in medical malpractice 
suits). 
13
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preferred authority to handle health care accountability issues 
because states traditionally regulate health care within their 
borders.96  Furthermore, the Court has held that traditional state 
regulation in the health care field would not be preempted by 
federal law without a “clear manifestation of congressional 
purpose.”97  Congress has equally recognized in past federal 
legislation that health care organizations are subject to a state’s 
regulatory powers.98  States are separate sovereigns in the federal 
system and tort remedies ought to remain within their historic 
policing powers.99 
2. Noneconomic Damage Caps Are Not the Determinant Factor 
GAO determined that insurance companies’ increased losses 
seem to be the greatest contributor to increased medical 
malpractice insurance rates.100  However, GAO was unable to 
determine the effects of health care settlements, trial verdicts, and 
economic and noneconomic damages on medical malpractice 
insurance rates.101  GAO concluded that there was not a 
comprehensive source of information on the breakdown of 
insurers’ losses between economic and noneconomic damages.102  
Factors other than noneconomic damages may therefore have 
caused or contributed to the resultant increase in medical 
malpractice insurance rates.103  These other factors include the 
presence of other tort reform measures,104 state laws regulating the 
 
 96. Evans, supra note 94.  Robert D. Evans, in his letter to the United States 
House of Representatives, cited both Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) 
(holding that state law applies to mixed eligibility decisions by physicians and are 
not fiduciary decisions under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA)) and Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 357 (2002) 
(holding that the ERISA statute does not preempt the Illinois Health Maintenance 
Organization Act). 
 97. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 237; see also Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484. 
 98. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 356-67 (emphasizing that Congress recognized 
HMOs as being subject to state regulation). 
 99. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 894 (2000). 
 100. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 4. 
 101. Professional Liability: GAO Sees Claims Losses as Main Driver of Long-Term Rise 
in Malpractice Premiums, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (July 29, 2003); see also 
MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 42-43 (concluding that the impact of “various 
measures” and lack of data makes it impossible to “quantify the impact of a cap on 
noneconomic damages on insurers’ losses”). 
 102. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 43. 
 103. Id. at 4. 
 104. See IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 11-12.  GAO named other sorts of tort 
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premium rate setting process,105 and certain market forces106 on the 
insurance industry.107 
Analyzing and comparing data from various states is more 
complicated than it appears.  The Department of Health and 
Human Services Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
reported that states with noneconomic damages caps in health care 
lawsuits have approximately twelve percent more physicians per 
capita than states without caps.108  However, GAO contends that it is 
difficult to compare states on the basis of whether or not they have 
enacted caps because state tort reform and insurance reform laws 
are dramatically different.109  GAO recommends that future data 
collection of frequency, severity, and cause of losses from medical 
malpractice suits would allow for appropriate analysis.110 
However, the Department of Health and Human Services 
blamed the “increasingly unpredictable, costly and slow litigation 
system” for the high medical liability insurance premiums.111  On 
the contrary, the litigation system is just as costly to medical 
malpractice insurers based on the significant expense to defend 
medical malpractice claims, as compared to the small number of 
successful claims that actually result in large jury awards.112  
 
reform provisions, which include abolishing collateral source payments, abolishing 
“joint and several liability,” restricting the statute of limitations, allowing periodic 
payment of damages, limiting attorney fees, requiring expert certification of 
claims, and providing for greater use of arbitration.  Id. 
 105. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 56-57 (explaining that statutory 
requirements vary by state, but generally provide that “insurance rates be 
adequate, not excessive, and not unfairly discriminatory”). 
 106. Id. at 4.  From 1998 through 2001, interest rates fell on bonds that made 
up about 80% of insurers’ investment portfolios.  Id.  “[A] decrease in investment 
income meant that income from insurance premiums had to cover a large share of 
insurers’ costs.”  Id.  Competition also encouraged offering low rates during times 
of high investment returns, which did not completely cover their ultimate losses 
for some insurers.  Id. 
 107. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 7. 
 108. White, supra note 82. 
 109. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 43 (explaining that damage caps can 
vary in amount, type of damages covered, and how the limitations apply). 
 110. Id. at 46.  “Such data would serve the interests of state and federal 
governments and allow both to better understand the causes of recurring crises in 
the medical malpractice insurance market and formulate the most appropriate 
and effective solutions.”  Id. 
 111. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: 
IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL 
LIABILITY SYSTEM (July 25, 2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/dal 
tcp/reports/litrefm.htm. 
 112. Id. (noting that in 2000 the average cost to defend a medical malpractice 
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Furthermore, results from a 1976 study, during a supposed 
“medical insurance liability crisis,” indicated that only 8–13% of 
filed claims went to trial, with only 1.2–1.9% resulting in a decision 
for the plaintiff.113  The Department of Health and Human Services 
also referred to a 1987 GAO study, which indicated that 57-70% of 
claims resulted in no payment to the patient.114  Thus, the major 
expense for insurance companies is in defending non-meritorious 
claims, not unlimited noneconomic damages that may potentially 
result from the small number of successful claimants. 
3. Noneconomic Damage Caps Do Not Provide Equal Protection 
Almost every state constitution encompasses an equal 
protection clause similar to the federal constitution.115  Statutes 
limiting noneconomic damages for medical malpractice claims 
violate equal protection because plaintiffs are arbitrarily 
distinguished from other tort victims.116  Capping noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice lawsuits also discriminates against 
low-income individuals who are unable to prove large economic 
damages but nonetheless suffer valid noneconomic damages.117  
Such noneconomic damage caps result in classifying plaintiffs 
based on the severity of the injury: less seriously injured patients 
are able to receive full compensation while more seriously injured 
patients are not able to receive adequate compensation.118  
 
claim was $24,669). 
 113. Id. (citing Jeffrey O’Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability, 60 
MINNESOTA: 501-506-509 (1976)). 
 114. Id. (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984, GAO/HRD-87-55, 18 (Apr. 1987)). 
 115. Anthony Viorst & Jim Leventhal, Constitutional Challenges to Damage-Cap 
Statutes, in ATLA WINTER CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS, ATLA-CLE 515 
(Winter 2004).  “Equal protection of the laws requires the government to treat 
similarly situated persons in a similar matter.”  Id. 
 116. Carol Crocca, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State 
Statutory Provisions Limiting Amount of Recovery in Medical Malpractice Claims, 26 
A.L.R. 5th 245 (1995). 
 117. See ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, supra note 13 (classifying 
low income individuals as “children, the elderly, the disabled, and others who may 
not have substantial earnings to establish lost wages”); see also AMERICAN POLITICAL 
NETWORK, Statelines Malpractice: AHL Features Developments in Five States, AMERICAN 
HEALTH LINE (Aug. 22, 2003).  In Texas, consumer advocacy groups and seniors 
argued that capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits would 
discriminate against low-income individuals because they are unable to prove large 
economic damages.  Id. 
 118. See ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, supra note 13. 
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Plaintiffs with valid claims are not the source of the problem; it is 
therefore unfair that seriously injured plaintiffs should be deprived 
of full compensation.119  Limiting damages that compensate a 
patient for his or her pain and suffering would therefore violate the 
basic legal premise that damages should be “sufficient in amount to 
indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered and thereby 
make him or her whole.”120 
Regardless, some state statutes that limit noneconomic 
damages have been upheld under the state constitutional 
guarantees of equal protection.121  Some of these statutes have also 
been upheld under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.122  In doing so, most courts have employed a rational 
basis test123 to review an equal protection challenge to statutory 
damage caps because the caps are economic in nature.124  The 
 
 119. Berger, supra note 15, at 184 (explaining that some individuals will be 
harmed by noneconomic damage caps).  The New Hampshire Supreme Court has 
consistently decided that noneconomic damage caps violate the state’s equal 
protection clause by distinguishing between classes of tortfeasors.  See, e.g., 
Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1236 (N.H. 1991) (focusing on the 
distinction “between malpractice victims with noneconomic losses that exceed[ed] 
$250,000 and those with less egregious non-economic losses”); Carson v. Maurer, 
424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980). 
 120. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 21 (2004).  “There is universal agreement that the 
compensatory goal of tort law requires that an injured plaintiff be made whole.”  
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). 
 121. Crocca, supra note 116 (citing cases that uphold the validity of statutes 
that limit noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions); see, e.g., Fein v. 
Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985); Mizrahi v. N. Miami Med. Ctr., 
Ltd., 761 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000); Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 
898 (Mo. 1992); Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1992); Robinson v. 
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991); Zdrojewski v. 
Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). 
 122. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1437 (9th Cir. 1985); Mizrahi, 
761 So. 2d at 1040. 
 123. See Berger, supra note 15, at 194 (explaining that the courts agree that the 
rational basis test should be used to determine if statutes limiting noneconomic 
damage caps have a “real and substantial relationship” to a legitimate state 
interest). 
 124. See Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1435; Fein, 695 P.2d at 679-80; Mizrahi, 761 So. 2d 
at 1043; Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 738; Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 883.  “Most 
legislative classifications, including those which involve economic rights, are 
subject to a minimal level of scrutiny, the traditional equal protection concept that 
the legislative classification will be upheld if it is reasonably related to the 
achievement of a legitimate state purpose.”  Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 883; see also 
Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 71 
(Neb. 2003).  But see Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1052 (Alaska 2002) 
(applying a three part “sliding scale” to analyze the right of equal protection 
under the Alaska Constitution). 
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rational basis test is satisfied if there is (1) a “plausible policy 
reason” for the classification of plaintiffs, (2) the legislative facts on 
which the classification is based may be considered true by a 
governmental decision maker, and (3) the classification in relation 
to its goal is not arbitrary.125 
When courts apply the rational basis test, they consistently find 
that statutes capping noneconomic damages are in fact rationally 
related to the legitimate government purposes of: (1) controlling 
health care costs and accessibility,126 or (2) reducing malpractice 
insurance premiums.127  However, these courts failed to conduct a 
proper analysis under the rational basis test because the courts did 
not assess the existence of a medical crisis within the state.128  Based 
on current statistics, limiting noneconomic damage caps is not the 
rational response to meet the goals of reducing medical 
malpractice insurance rates.129  Regardless, a court may revere this 
as judicial fact-finding, and choose not to adopt such reasoning.130 
The dissenting opinion in Fein v. Permanent Medical Group 
agreed with applying the rational basis test, but disagreed with the 
level of scrutiny applied under the rational basis test by the 
majority.131  The majority required that the legislation not only 
serve a conceivable legislative purpose, but also that each 
classification has a “fair and substantial relationship to a legitimate 
purpose.”132  The dissent, however, correctly reasoned that under 
 
 125. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 71. 
 126. Mizrahi, 761 N.W.2d at 1043; Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 739. 
 127. Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 695 P.2d at 680. 
 128. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) (“When we 
examine the legislative purpose of the Act, we find that the incidence of 
malpractice claims in North Dakota is far lower than average in the United 
States.”); see also Mizrahi, 761 N.W.2d at 1043 (Pariente, J., dissenting) (“There is 
no indication that the past medical malpractice crisis continues into the present. . 
. . Indeed, it is a ‘settled principle of constitutional law’ that although a statue is 
constitutionally valid when enacted, that statute may become constitutionally 
invalid due to the changes in the conditions to which the statute applies.”). 
 129. See Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 167 (Ala. 1991) 
(citing a GAO study suggesting that “the connection between damage caps and 
the total cost of health care “is remote, pointing out that, despite statutory reform, 
including damage caps, in place for nearly ten years in some states, total medical 
malpractice costs for physicians and hospitals rose by more than either the 
consumer price index or the medical care index in that period.”); see also supra 
Part III.B.2. 
 130. Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 
55-56 (Neb. 2003). 
 131. 695 P.2d 665, 691 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. at 692. 
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the second prong of the analysis the $250,000 damage cap should 
have been regarded as “grossly underinclusive” by any standard 
applied.133  Thus there is no rational basis for classifying the most 
severely injured patients to pay for the monetary relief to physicians 
and their medical malpractice insurers.134 
When courts apply an intermediate test, however, limiting 
noneconomic damages has been found to be in violation of some 
state constitutional guarantees of equal protection.135  The 
intermediate test employs a higher degree of scrutiny than the 
rational basis test.136  State courts that have employed an 
intermediate review have done so because “[a]lthough the right to 
recover for personal injuries is not a ‘fundamental right,’ it is 
nevertheless an important substantive right.”137  States are able to 
grant individuals more rights than the Federal Constitution 
requires.138  To do so under the intermediate test, the court must 
determine (1) “whether the statute has a fair and substantial 
relation to this legitimate legislative objective” and (2) “whether it 
imposes unreasonable restrictions on private rights.”139  Using the 
intermediate test, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that 
damage caps preclude full recovery for patients with meritorious 
claims, do nothing toward the elimination of nonmeritorious 
claims, and actually encourage physicians to practice at the expense 
of patients with meritorious claims.140  Limits on noneconomic 
damages should therefore not be upheld under any meaningful 
 
 133. Id.  “Although the Legislature normally enjoys wide latitude in 
distributing the burdens of personal injuries, the singling out of such a miniscule 
and vulnerable group violates even the most undemanding standard of 
underinclusiveness.”  Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Crocca, supra note 116 (citing cases that do not uphold the validity of 
statutes limiting noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions); see, e.g., 
Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 169 (Ala. 1991) (concluding that 
the legislative goal of lowering insurance costs would not be supported through 
noneconomic damage caps because “paid-out damage awards constitute only a 
small part of total insurance premium costs”); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 834 
(N.H. 1980) (holding that the statute precluded full recovery for severely injured 
plaintiffs, creating classifications among medical malpractice plaintiffs that 
unfairly denied such plaintiffs equal protection of the laws). 
 136. Berger, supra note 15, at 194. 
 137. Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1234 (N.H. 1991) (quoting Carson, 
424 A.2d at 830). 
 138. Carson, 424 A.2d at 831. 
 139. Brannigan, 587 A.2d at 1234 (quoting Carson, 424 A.2d at 832); see also 
Moore, 592 So. 2d at 165-66. 
 140. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978). 
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level of judicial scrutiny, even the rational basis test. 
The Alabama Supreme Court also correctly determined that 
the correlation between noneconomic damage caps and the 
reduction of health care costs is indirect and remote.141  Even 
though there is evidence that noneconomic damage caps have a 
possible connection to the size of claims, again, they are only one of 
a multitude of factors.142  The New Hampshire Supreme Court has 
similarly concluded that there is a weak relationship between the 
legislature’s goal of insurance rate reduction and limiting 
noneconomic damages.143  Courts, such as the Illinois and New 
Hampshire Supreme Courts, have reminded Congress that the 
power of remittitur144 is always available and is the correct judicial 
tool that should be used in the event of an excessive jury award.145 
C. Health Care Liability in Minnesota 
Minnesota does not impose noneconomic damage caps in 
medical malpractice suits.146  Minnesota’s doctors, per 100,000 
 
 141. Moore, 592 So. 2d at 168. 
 142. Id. at 168-69. 
 143. See Brannigan, 587 A.2d at 1236; Carson, 424 A.2d at 836. 
 144. Remittitur is the “process by which a court reduces or proposes to reduce 
the damages awarded in a jury verdict.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (7th ed. 
1999). 
 145. See Brannigan, 587 A.2d at 1236; Carson, 424 A.2d at 837.  If the federal 
government enacts legislation to preempt state laws in medical malpractice suits, 
then the law may also be challenged on constitutional separation-of-power 
grounds.  Evans, supra note 94; see also Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 
1057 (Ill. 1997).  The American Bar Association advises that courts should use 
their powers of remittitur to set aside excessive verdicts, instead of limiting 
damages that would not ensure adequate compensation.  Evans, supra note 94; see 
also Carson, 424 A.2d at 837.  Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that 
the $500,000 noneconomic damage cap violated the state’s separation of powers 
clause by invading the judiciary’s power of remittitur.  Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1080. 
The courts are constitutionally empowered, and indeed obligated, to 
reduce excessive verdicts where appropriate in light of the evidence 
adduced in a particular case.  Section 2-1115.1, however, reduces 
damages by operation of law, without regard to the specific 
circumstances of individual jury awards. Although legislative limits upon 
certain types of damages may be permitted, such as damages recoverable 
in statutory causes of action, we hold that the cap in section 2-1115.1 
violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. 
Id. at 1081.  For further discussion of the constitutionality of noneconomic 
damages see Kevin J. Gfell, Note, The Constitutional and Economic Implications of a 
National Cap on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions, 37 IND. L. REV. 
773 (2004) and Viorst & Leventhal, supra note 115. 
 146. TABLE 1B, supra note 41; see also MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM, supra note 44. 
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county residents, increased from 75 in 1970 to 126 in 2000, a 68% 
increase.147  California, with a $250,000 noneconomic damage cap, 
however, has only had a 47.2% increase within the same time 
period.148  The fact is that, caps or no caps, from 1975 to 1986 the 
incurred losses for medical malpractice insurers were on the rise in 
both Minnesota and California.149  Incurred losses for medical 
malpractice insurers similarly declined drastically in 1986 for 
Minnesota and did the same in 1988 for California.150  As previously 
concluded, insurance reform caused California’s 1988 decline in 
medical malpractice insurance rates, not noneconomic damage 
caps.151 
Minnesota’s drastic decline in medical malpractice insurers’ 
losses was caused by two significant pieces of legislation that passed 
in 1986.  The first legislation was Minnesota Statutes section 
145.682,152 which was explicitly enacted in an effort to remedy 
rising costs of medical insurance by reducing frivolous health care 
lawsuits.153  Section 145.682 does not limit noneconomic damages, 
but rather requires an affidavit from an expert demonstrating that 
the expert believes that the plaintiff has a valid claim.154  Another 
affidavit listing expert witnesses must be served upon the defendant 
within 180 days after commencement of the suit.155  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court continues to uphold a case dismissal if a plaintiff 
fails to obtain sufficient certification of expert review.156  This 
 
 147. TABLE 1B, supra note 41. 
 148. TABLE 1A, supra note 38. 
 149. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 21 (Figure 6: Inflation-Adjusted 
Incurred Losses for Medical Malpractice Insurers in Seven Selected States, 1975-
2001). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
 152. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2002). 
 153. Leo, supra note 5, at 1404-05. 
 154. MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subd. 2.  “At a minimum, a ‘meaningful disclosure’ 
is required [for] setting forth the standard of care, the act or omissions violating 
that standard, and the chain of causation.”  Teffeteller v. Univ. of Minn., 645 
N.W.2d 420, 430 (Minn. 2002). 
 155. MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subd. 4 (2002).  The statute requires an affidavit 
listing the expert witnesses whom the plaintiff may call to testify as to issues of 
malpractice causation, the substance of their testimony, and a summary of the 
grounds for each witness’ opinion.  Id.  The attorney and each expert witness must 
sign the affidavit.  Id. 
 156. See Teffeteller, 645 N.W.2d at 431.  The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld 
the trial court’s holding that the physician’s affidavit failed to meet the statutory 
requirements and dismissal with prejudice was appropriate.  Id.  The court has also 
upheld a district court holding that “respondent failed to file a sufficient affidavit 
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legislation effectively remedied the expense of defending against 
frivolous lawsuits and should be utilized by other states prior to 
jumping to noneconomic damages caps.157 
A major factor assessed in the American Medical Association’s 
determination of whether or not a state is in medical liability crisis 
is the magnitude of patients losing access to health care.158  The 
second piece of significant Minnesota legislation approved in 1986 
addressed this issue by establishing rural hospital financial 
assistance grants.159  This rural health initiative required the 
commissioner of health, through the office of rural health, to 
provide financial assistance to rural hospitals that were in danger of 
closing without such assistance.160  Unfortunately, on June 5, 2003, 
the Minnesota Legislature repealed the statute providing financial 
assistance to rural hospitals.161 
Notably, Minnesota’s largest insurance company’s medical 
liability insurance rates for general surgeons only increased by 2% 
from 1999 to 2002, compared to a 75% increase in Florida162 and a 
130% increase in Pennsylvania.163  Despite these favorable statistics 
in Minnesota, Minnesota has somehow been classified by the AMA 
as a state showing “problem signs” in the area of medical liability.164  
Even with Minnesota’s success in reducing frivolous lawsuits and 
past assistance for hospitals in rural areas, health care reform bills 
were active in the 2003-04 regular session and biennial budget 
session.  On February 20, 2003, H.F. 482 was introduced in the 
Minnesota House of Representatives, had a first reading, and was 
 
within the 180-day deadline and that failure to comply results in mandatory 
dismissal upon motion.”  Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572, 577 
(Minn. 1999).  When the plaintiff fails to comply with the 180-day requirement, 
each cause of action for which expert testimony is required must be dismissed 
upon defendant’s motion.  Stroud v. Hennepin County Med. Ctr., 556 N.W.2d 
552, 555 (Minn. 1996). 
 157. See Dan Oberdorfer, State Taking the Steps to Limit Excessive Jury Awards, 
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 21, 1986, at 1A. “[T]he Minnesota 
Medical Association found that 60% of all malpractice claims are closed with no 
money paid out.”  Id. 
 158. Blaney-Koen, supra note 53. 
 159. MINN. STAT. § 144.1484 (1986) (repealed 2003). 
 160. MINN. STAT. § 144.1483 (1986) (repealed subd. 3, 2003). 
 161. 2003 Minn. Laws, ch. 13, art. 7, § 89.  
 162. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 3.  “The resulting 2002 premium rate 
quoted by the Florida insurer was $174,300 a year, more than seventeen times the 
$10,140 premium rate quoted by the insurer in Minnesota.”  Id. 
 163. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 9. 
 164. MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM , supra note 44. 
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referred to the Civil Law Committee.165  Its companion Senate bill, 
S.F. 459, was also introduced, had a first reading, and was referred 
to the Judiciary Committee.166  Both House and Senate bills 
proposed limits of $250,000 for noneconomic damages in an action 
for injury or death against a health care provider, but neither 
passed.167  Noneconomic damages would inevitably include all non-
pecuniary harm for which damages are recoverable.168  In 2005, the 
Minnesota Legislature is considering a $250,000 cap on 
noneconomic damages in actions for injury or death against a 
health care provider.169 
Even though medical malpractice insurance rates are low and 
the supply of physicians is increasing, the legislature may be 
considering tort reform because “rising health care costs and 
health coverage has again become a critical issue for 
Minnesotans.”170  The legislature may also be reacting to President 
Bush’s national push on tort reform or the recent withdrawal of St. 
Paul Companies from the medical malpractice insurance market.171  
Minnesota’s St. Paul Companies, at one time the largest medical 
malpractice insurer in the country, stopped selling malpractice 
insurance nationwide in December of 2001.172  The chairman and 
chief executive officer of St. Paul Companies blamed recent market 
 
 165. H.R. 452, 83rd Leg. (Minn. 2003).  H.F. 452 was authored by Minnesota 
House Representatives Lipman, Kohls, DeLaforest, Gerlach, Holberg, et al. 
 166. S.F. 459, 83rd Leg. (Minn. 2003).  S.F. 459 was authored by Minnesota 
Senators Michel, LeClair, and Kiscaden. 
 167. H.R. 452, § 4, subd. 2; S.F. 459, § 4 subd. 2. 
 168. H.R. 452, § 4, subd. 1; S.F. 459, § 4, subd. 1 (defining noneconomic loss as 
“all non pecuniary harm for which damages are recoverable, including but not 
limited to pain, disability, disfigurement, embarrassment, emotional distress, and 
loss of consortium”). 
 169. H.F. No. 2, 84th Leg. (Minn. 2005) (introduced, had a first reading, and 
referred to the Health Policy & Finance Committee on January 6, 2005); S.F. No. 
0376, 84th Leg. (Minn. 2005) (introduced, had a first reading, and referred to the 
Health and Security Family Committee on January 19, 2005).  In addition, the 
Minnesota Legislature is considering a resolution to support President Bush’s 
policy on medical liability tort reform.  See H.F. No. 1029, 84th Leg. (Minn. 2005) 
(introduced, had a first reading, and referred to the Civil Law and Elections 
Committee on February 14, 2005); S.F. No. 1107, 84th Leg. (Minn. 2005) 
(introduced, had a first reading, and referred to the Judiciary Committee on 
February 21, 2005). 
 170. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THE JOINT TASK FORCE ON 
HEALTH COSTS AND QUALITY, at http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/hpsc/hep 
/JTF/ jtfintro.htm (last updated June 24, 2004). 
 171. MINNESOTA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, BUSH PROPOSES MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
REFORM (2003), at http://www.mnmed.org/News/fullstory.cfm?recNum=2596. 
 172. Id.; see also MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 34. 
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trends.173  Even though St. Paul Companies provided insurance 
nationally, medical malpractice insurance rates depend on varying 
compositions of insurance, legal, and health care structures within 
a state.174 
Minnesota has a history of social consciousness and leadership 
in health care matters.175  Minnesota should not consider 
noneconomic damage caps in any tort reform plan because of 
Minnesota’s current success in patient accessibility and low medical 
malpractice rates.  However, due to the recent repeal of financial 
aid to rural hospitals, Minnesota should continue to monitor access 
to health care in rural areas. 
D. Considerations for Future Legislation 
Whether under the Federal or State legislative umbrella, 
capping noneconomic damages will not solve the medical 
insurance liability crisis.  All legislators should seriously consider 
how noneconomic damage caps would affect the health care 
system.176  Even if noneconomic damage caps would influence 
lower medical malpractice insurance rates for physicians, the caps 
may in turn increase health insurance costs for the public because 
they are the potential victims of medical negligence.177  Any 
legislative solution should include (1) a process to reduce the 
incidence of medical malpractice by physicians, (2) assessment of 
insurance regulation as to how insurance rates are set, and (3) a 
process to reduce the number of frivolous medical malpractice 
cases.178 
 
 173. MINNESOTA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ST. PAUL COS. TO DROP MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE BUSINESS, at http://www.mmaonline.net/News/fullstory.cfm?rec 
Num=2197 (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). 
 174. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 46.  GAO concluded, and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioner’s Director of Research 
concurred, that “medical malpractice markets are not national in nature, but vary 
widely with regard to their insurance markets, regulatory framework, legal 
environment, and health care structures” within the states.  Id. 
 175. Keith Halleland & Deanna Mills, Beyond Band-Aids, STAR TRIBUNE 
(Minneapolis- St. Paul), Oct. 7, 2002, at D3. 
 176. CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE FALLOUT VARIES ACROSS COMMUNITIES (2003), at 
http://www.hschange.com/ CONTENT/606/. 
 177. Carson v. Mauer, 424 A.2d 825, 835 (N.H. 1980). 
 178. Martha Kessler, Connecticut: Governor Calls For Lawmakers to Adopt Cap on 
Noneconomic Malpractice Awards, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (Sept. 17, 
2003). 
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Minnesota has addressed these issues in the following ways.  
First, Minnesota has peer review organizations intact to reduce the 
incidence of medical malpractice.179  The purpose of peer review is 
to assure that discussion of medical errors occurs without threat of 
medical malpractice suits.180  Secondly, the Minnesota Department 
of Commerce regulates the insurance industry through a file and 
use system.181  In 2001, the Department of Commerce introduced a 
“speed to market” filing procedure for insurance companies that 
meet certain requirements.182  Third, Minnesota requires expert 
affidavits to limit frivolous lawsuits, which contributed to the drastic 
decline in medical liability insurers’ losses in 1986.183 
Even though these measures have aided in reducing medical 
malpractice insurance rates in Minnesota, such measures should be 
reassessed as compositions of insurance, legal, and health care 
structures change over time.  Each state should make similar 
assessments to create the proper balance of tort and insurance 
reform to decrease medical malpractice insurance rates.  Many tort 
reform alternatives are available: abolish collateral source 
payments, abolish “joint and several liability,” restrict the statute of 
limitations, allow periodic payment of damages, limit attorney fees, 
require expert certification of claims, and provide for greater use 
of arbitration.184 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Legislatures have legitimate concerns about the health care 
delivery system, but the panacea of the “medical liability crisis” does 
not lie in capping noneconomic damages.  The federal government 
should not cap noneconomic damages because: (1) states are in 
the best position to regulate health care, (2) statistics show that 
noneconomic damages are not the determinate factor in increasing 
medical liability insurance rates, and (3) caps do not provide equal 
protection by limiting compensation of medical malpractice 
victims.  Even at the state level, noneconomic damage caps should 
 
 179. MINN. STAT. §§ 145.61-67 (2003).  The review organizations “share 
information for the purpose of identifying and analyzing trends in medical error 
and iatrogenic injury.”  MINN. STAT. § 145.61 (q). 
 180. In re Fairview Univ. Med. Ctr., 590 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999). 
 181. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 61. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See supra  Part III.C. 
 184. See IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 11-12. 
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not be a part of tort reform legislation.  A small number of severely 
injured victims should not have to suffer so that medical 
malpractice insurance rates will decrease.  Other insurance and tort 
reform measures should be utilized to protect physicians against 
frivolous lawsuits and provide full compensation for those injured 
in rare cases of physician negligence. 
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